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Abstract— Wireless ad hoc networks are so vulnerable to passive 
attacks and eavesdropping adversaries due to their shared 
medium which makes network traffic easy to capture and 
analyze. Therefore, security and privacy protections are of 
extreme importance for protocols and applications in such 
networks. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for 
anonymous routing, named chain-based routing, to improve the 
privacy. In our framework, nodes on a path are virtually bound 
to each other like a chain. Each node is only aware of its 
associated links in a flow and does not require any other 
information about source, destination, or other parts of the chain. 
Based on this framework, we propose an on-demand routing 
protocol, called Chain-based Anonymous Routing (CAR), which 
uses unicast-based broadcast data transfer to fulfill anonymous 
communication in wireless ad hoc networks. Through hiding 
identifiers of nodes inside the chain, CAR realizes sender, 
receiver, and relationship anonymity in addition to untraceability 
in the network. Moreover, it is resistant to a wide range of 
passive attacks while adapting to implement other security 
mechanisms in the presence of active attacks. 
Keywords-component; Wireless ad hoc networks, security, 
anonymity, chain-based routing, unicast-based broadcast. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a wireless ad hoc network, mobile nodes cooperate 
within an infrastructureless network. Due to the shared wireless 
medium and open peer-to-peer network architecture, ad hoc 
networks intrinsically are vulnerable to a wide range of security 
threats. Desire for a protected communication in a potentially 
hostile environment has made security and privacy a major 
challenging issue in such networks. 
In this paper, we consider wireless ad hoc networks 
deployed in hostile environments. The shared and open 
medium of such networks introduces abundant opportunities 
for passive eavesdropping on data communications. This 
means that internal or external adversaries can easily overhear 
all the messages flying in the air even without physically 
compromising any node. While end-to-end security 
mechanisms can provide confidentiality for transferred data 
between communication nodes, some valuable information 
such as location and relationships of communicating entities 
might be determined from traffic analysis easily. This is 
extremely dangerous since adversaries can identify critical 
nodes and launch directed attacks to them. Here, we seek 
efficient solutions to dangerous passive attacks through 
anonymous communication in the network. This means that the 
communication partners are secret and nodes could 
communicate, while their identifier is not detectable from the 
exchanged messages. 
We introduce a new framework for anonymous routing, 
named chain-based routing. In our framework, nodes on a path 
are virtually bounded to each other like a chain. Each node is 
only aware of its immediate neighbors in the chain, and does 
not require any other information about source, destination or 
other parts of the chain. As a result, sender, receiver and 
relationship anonymity are held in the framework and attackers 
are not capable of finding out the relationships among nodes by 
observing the system (unlinkability)  [1]. Moreover, attackers 
have not the ability of tracing transferred packets to find the 
end points of a connection (untraceability), and also they 
cannot recognize packets belonging to the same ongoing 
communication flow in multiple sessions. Then, based on the 
proposed framework, we design a novel on-demand routing 
protocol, called CAR, which provides untraceability of routing, 
unlinkability among nodes, and anonymity in communications 
between wireless ad hoc devices. CAR ensures unlocatability 
and untrackability, meaning that although adversaries might 
know the real network identifiers, they are unable to decide 
whom and where the corresponding nodes are in the network 
and who is communicating with whom. Using a chain of fresh 
and secure identifiers and replacing the complex cryptography 
algorithms with simple and robust operations, the algorithm 
enables us to achieve a secure and flexible anonymity protocol 
with low overhead on nodes. As a main objective of our 
method the discovered routes are verified. This prevents the 
attackers from launching some DoS and replay attacks. CAR is 
an efficient routing protocol confirmed by detailed simulation 
results. It is also resistant to several threats and can be adapted 
to the other security methods to counter active attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  II 
explains the related works. In Section  III, we illustrate our 
framework for chain-based anonymous routing. Section  IV 
demonstrates the system model. CAR is explained in Section 
 V. Evaluation and performance analysis are illustrated in 
Sections  VI and  VII. Finally, Section  VIII concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we briefly revisit several anonymous routing 
schemes recently proposed for wireless ad hoc networks. 
Almost all of the methods are inspired from fixed wired 
network techniques  [2] [3] [4] [5]. Unfortunately special 
characteristics of ad hoc networks such as absence of fixed 
infrastructure, mobility of nodes, energy and computation 
power constraints make previous approaches inapplicable to 
mobile ad hoc networks. Some works address the anonymity 
problem in terms of routing schemes.  [6] explores the use of 
mixes  [3] in MANETs. An anonymous on-demand routing 
protocol, named ANODR, has been proposed in  [7] to conceal 
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Figure 1. the sequence of <PathChain, PathID> pairs exchange in a chain between S and D. 
network identifiers of communicating nodes using onion 
routing. In ASR  [8] and MASK  [9], nodes forwarding a route 
request message keep the state of the messages to reforward 
them later. SDAR  [10] is another protocol which uses 
encrypted route messages to achieve anonymity. ARM  [11], as 
another method, uses random data padding in addition to an 
onion like technique  [5] to harden the protocol in front of 
passive adversaries. Moreover, the effect of mobility on an 
anonymous routing protocol is shown in  [12] illustrating the 
impact of anonymous algorithms on routing performance. 
Low efficiency and large overhead on relay nodes in route 
discovery and forwarding phases are the main drawbacks of the 
mentioned protocols. In addition, in most of these methods the 
sender should be aware of the entire path. Moreover, some of 
the protocols put the overhead of several encoding/decoding 
operations on either relays or end nodes that makes them 
inapplicable to ad hoc networks. 
III. CHAIN-BASED ROUTING FRAMEWORK 
First, we explain the idea behind the chain-based routing as 
an on-demand routing framework. The main objective of our 
framework is to allow end nodes authenticate each other and 
verify the path while discover routes anonymously. Every 
node, either an end points or a relay node, assigns a fresh secret 
key to each session which is used in the construction of the 
chain between the source and destination nodes. During the 
route discovery phase, in which the source node broadcasts its 
request to the network, each node alters the message and 
rebroadcasts it to its neighbors. So, several messages reach to 
the destination having traversed multiple paths (chains). Every 
node in a chain has two links corresponding to its upstream and 
downstream nodes labeled with different unique identifiers 
fastened together using secret keys of the nodes. More 
precisely, we extend the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method 
[13] to create the chain. Definition 1 explains the procedure in 
details. 
Definition 1. Consider k sequential nodes in a particular 
path ki n,...,n,...,n1 , a certain prime number p, and a generator g 
where 
*
pZg ∈ . Each node i calculates fi as follows and passes it 
to the next node along the path: 
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where Si is the secret key of node i. 
We define PathChain1,k as the value of fk, which is the 
result of subsequent calculation of  fi, in the path sequentially 
from the first node to the last one (kth node). Consequently, 
value of PathChain1,k equals fk. We have: 
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Obviously, PathChain1,k strictly depends on all nodes along 
the path. Furthermore, it is not possible for any node to 
recognize its position among the path. Hence, no PathChain 
value should reveal any information about its traveled path. 
Proposition 1. For a given path ki n,...,n,...,n1 , the value of 
PathChain1,k equals to PathChaink,1, where p, g, and Si are the 
same for both of them. 
Proof. The straight implementation of Definition 1 results in 
PathChain1,k. While, backward implementation of it 
(PathChaink,1) obviously results in the following value: 
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This is the same as PathChain1,k. ? 
Thanks to the difficulty of discrete logarithmic in Diffie-
Hellman problem, owner of a secrete key only could relates the 
PathChain values of its immediate nodes in the chain while no 
other one can do this. To construct the chain a route discovery 
performs by the sender to provide various possible paths. 
Response from the other end of connection stabilizes the chain. 
Based on the Proposition 1, for a given path, constructed chain 
between the source and destination is equals to the reverse 
chain value. Then, both source and destination nodes could 
authenticate each other and verify the path using the final 
PathChain value. One consideration is that several PathChain 
values from multiple paths might reach to the destination 
whether it must reply to one of them (or many of them in 
multipath routing). Since the PathChain is not reversible, to 
direct the reply message through the same path that the request 
has traversed, we use PathID as demonstrated in Definition 2. 
The reversible manner of PathID is shown in Proposition 2. 
Definition 2. Consider k sequential nodes in a particular 
path ki n,...,n,...,n1 , PathID1,i (calculated from the first node to 
the ith node) and PathIDk,i (calculated in reverse order from the 
last node to the ith node) are defined as following: 
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where IDi is the current transient identifier of node i. 
Proposition 2. For a given path ki n,...,n,...,n1 , the value of 
PathID1,i is equal to PathIDk,i+1 for an intermediate node i. 
Proof. It is straightforward. ? 
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TABLE I. NOTATIONS USED IN THE PAPER. 
S: Source node of a communication. Kirj: The DH private key of node i in jth round. 
D: Destination node of a communication. IDirj: The transient forwarding identity of node i in jth round. 
PVi: The private key of node i. Enck(M): Encryption of message M with the key k. 
PKi: The public key of node i corresponding to PVi. Deck(M): Decryption of message M with the key k. 
SKj: The session key of jth round. Nirj: A nonce generated by node i for using in jth round. 
Pirj: A large prime number, used in jth round by node i. Girj: A primitive root of Pirj in node i. ( *pji ZrG ∈ ). 
Based on Proposition 2, using PathID in addition to 
PathChain enables us to route the Route Replay message 
corresponding to a PathChain through the same nodes it 
traversed in the Route Request phase. Figure 1 shows the 
sequence of <PathChain, PathID> pairs are exchanged in a 
chain during route discovery process. After the route discovery, 
data packets are routed in the network by means of PathChain. 
To conclude, our framework has a number of 
characteristics including non-source-based routing, having 
flexible and reliable route selection, resilience against any 
spoofing and hijacking in the path discovery phase, and 
imposing very low overhead on nodes during data forwarding. 
Moreover, while all of communications are established 
anonymously, no global eavesdropper can link two nodes as 
suspect for having contact. More details about the behavior of 
chain-based routing in front of multiple adversaries are 
discussed in Section V. 
IV. SYSTEM MODEL 
Before presenting our protocol, we state our assumptions, 
data model, and model of adversary. Moreover, Table I 
summarizes the main notations used in the paper. 
A. Assumptions 
In order to represent the problem formally and to make it 
practical and conceivable for implementation and analysis, we 
have used the following assumptions, which have been 
presented in other previous studies [7][8][9][11]. Links 
between wireless nodes are bi-directional. So, routes between 
nodes could be symmetric. Each wireless node has a unique 
identifier (e.g. IP address) which makes the node uniquely 
recognizable. Each node has a certificate and private key by 
means of a trusted certificate authority in key predistribution 
phase. Besides, every node knows the certificates of its peer. 
Each node has a pool of pre-calculated large prime numbers (p) 
and their corresponding primitive roots in *pZ . There are some 
adversaries in the network such that they intentionally do not 
follow routing or forwarding protocols and also may want to 
expose the traffic information. Any active attacker which has 
compromised some nodes in the network owns all the 
cryptographic key information of them and distributes such 
information among other attackers. 
B. Data Model 
Our method employs some data structures which will be 
covered in detail along the paper. The major data structures 
used in our protocols are as following: 
Flow Table – Is kept in the source and destination, contains 
the state information of a session after route setup. Attributes 
of the table are: PeerID, SessionKey, Identifier, Key, Nonce, 
PrimeNumber, Generator, RoundNumber, and 
FlowActiveness. 
Forwarding Table – Contains information necessary to 
forward packets in relay nodes. Attributes of forwarding table 
are: Down-PathID, Down-PathChain, Up-PathChain, 
Identifier, Key, RoundNumber, NACK, and RouteActiveness. 
RREQ message – Is the exchanged message during the Route 
Request phase. It contains the following fields: Trapdoor, 
PathID, PathChain, PrimeNumber, and RoundNumber. The 
“Trapdoor” is compound by: 
 ( )j||rG||rN||ID||IDETrapdoor jSjSDsPKj D=  (1) 
RREP message – Is the message exchanged during the Route 
Reply phase. It includes following fields: Response, PathID, 
and PathChain. The “Response” is compound by: 
( )j||rN||ID||IDEsponseRe jSDSSKj j 1+=  (2) 
RERR message – Is used in route maintenance phase when a 
route failure detected. It only consists of two fields: 
PathChain, and RoundNumber. 
Data Packet – Our method modifies the header of the IP 
packet such that the source and destination fields are replaced 
by two new fields for the sake of anonymity. Also, the address 
fields of MAC header are replaced with the broadcast address. 
The header of data packets consists of two fields: PathChain 
and SequenceNumber. 
C. Adversary  Model 
Our attacker model consists of two main classes of 
attackers: passive and active. A passive attacker does not send 
any message; it just eavesdrops on the network and tries to find 
the relationships between nodes by observing the network 
traffic. An active attacker injects packets into the network 
while it eavesdrops as well. Such attackers attempt to corrupt 
the network protocols. In this paper we also take into account 
some cooperating attackers inside the network. 
V. CAR PROTOCOL 
To realize anonymous communication in wireless ad hoc 
networks we present an on-demand routing protocol, called 
CAR, to establish chains between source-destination pairs. In 
this protocol, each node maintains the flow table and 
forwarding table, as mentioned in the previous section. Like all 
on-demand routing protocols, CAR has two major stages: route 
discovery and route maintenance. After the route discovery 
process, nodes can communicate with each other using 
PathChains field. 
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A. Route Request 
Route Discovery is initiated by sending RREQ (Route 
Request) message whenever a source node needs to 
communicate with another node for which it has no routing 
information in its flow table. The format of RREQ message has 
been illustrated in Section IV.B. The source node first creates 
Trapdoor by using the destination public key as illustrated in 
(1). Later, the Trapdoor is used by other nodes receiving this 
message to check whether the packet destined for them. The 
Nonce and RoundNumber fields of Trapdoor are used to 
prevent replay and modification attacks in the path. In addition, 
the Trapdoor and RoundNumber fields are used for loop-free 
routes construction. After construction of the RREQ message, 
the source node broadcast it in the network. 
Every node, i, receiving RREQ checks whether it is the 
destination of the message. To do this, it tries to decrypt 
Trapdoor of the message by its private key, PVi, and then 
compares the IDD part of the result with its real identifier and 
RoundNumber of the message with the RoundNumber field of 
decrypted Trapdoor. If the node is not the intended destination, 
then it only forwards the packet. It regenerates PathID and 
PathChain parameters by means of message header contents 
and its local keys and then broadcasts the updated RREQ to its 
neighbors, besides inserting new corresponding entry to its 
forwarding table. It is worth noting that PathIDs are 
regenerated for every new route discovery. As a result, 
PathIDs are gained from a compromised node give no 
information to the attackers from the other connections of that 
node. On the other hand, duplicated messages must be dropped. 
Each node recognizes the RREQ that had been previously 
forwarded, by checking the Trapdoor and RoundNumber fields 
in its forwarding table. If there is an entry corresponds to them, 
the packet is duplicated. 
In CAR, it is possible that several RREQ messages from 
multiple paths reach to the destination from a unique source. In 
such situations, destination node selects the first one, because it 
almost sure is received from the shortest path. Consequently, it 
creates a new entry related to the message in its flow table and 
replies to RREQ by starting the Route Reply phase. 
B. Route Reply 
In the first step, destination node calculates the final 
PathChain and sets it to the session key (SKj) of the 
connection. As mentioned before, since the final PathChain is 
created in the source node is equal to SKj, this is used by the 
source node to authenticate the destination. Moreover, since the 
session key is depends on all of the nodes in the path, it verifies 
that the RREQ and RREP (Route Reply) messages pass through 
the same sequence of nodes. Thus, the destination node creates 
a Response field in the RREP message, encrypted with SKj as 
illustrated in (2). While the only node that can open the 
Trapdoor field of RREQ is the intended destination, no other 
node possibly will be aware about the real identifiers encrypted 
in it. Putting these identifiers encrypted in the Response field 
helps to authenticate the destination node. Adding the 
RoundNumber and incremented Nonce in the Response field, 
makes replay attacks impossible. 
Using the generator field of Trapdoor (Gsrj) and the 
PrimeNumber of the RREQ message (Psrj), the destination node 
first generates PathChain value and puts it in the RREP 
message. Besides, PathID of the RREP message is equal to the 
same PathID field of the received RREQ message. After 
constructing the RREP message, the destination node 
broadcasts it to its neighbors. Immediate sending of this 
message may lead to increasing potential interference around 
the node, because of the reception of several RREQ message 
from multiple paths. Thus, we delay the packet based on a 
uniform distribution from 0 to 5ms. In contrast to the Route 
Request phase, where the message is broadcasted throughout 
the network, in Route Reply phase, control message is sent 
back to the source node through the unicast-based broadcast. In 
this phase, identification of duplicated packets is done by 
checking the Response filed. A node receiving an RREP 
propagates the first RREP towards the source. If it receives 
further RREPs, it updates its forwarding information and 
propagates the RREP only if the RREP contains a new Response 
value. As the RREP travels back to the source, each node which 
has a forwarding entry related to the message updates and 
enables its forwarding entry and relays RREP to the next node 
by broadcasting it. When the packet reaches to the source node, 
it tries to decrypt the Response filed. To insure that the packet 
is received from the desirable destination and path, the source 
node compares the decrypted attributes of Response with its 
Flow Table. If there is an entry corresponding to them, it 
updates its Flow Table. Afterward, data transmission will be 
done in the reserved path through the network. 
C. Route Maintenance 
Movement of nodes which are not laid along an active path 
does not affect the corresponding routing information. If any 
node belonging to a path moves and consequently becomes 
unreachable from its neighbors, path breakage occurs. 
Furthermore, if the source node still requires a route to the 
destination, as an alternative it can restart the discovery 
process. To determine whether a route is still needed, a node 
may check whether the route has been used recently, as well as 
inspect upper-layer protocol’s control blocks to see if the 
connection remains open. In addition, it can only remove the 
corresponding entry for such a destination from its flow table. 
Consequently when the source wants to send a packet destined 
for that destination it gets informed about path breakage. 
To inform the source of a path from link failure along the 
path, intermediate nodes must be aware of unreachablity of 
upstream neighbors along the path. Every node in the network 
maintains a simple variable about reachability of next hop 
nodes in its routing table. In CAR, when a node forwards a 
packet, it can not determine whether the next hop in the path 
has received the packet correctly, since the receiver never 
sends any acknowledgment. Due to the wireless medium of the 
network, when a node transmits a packet, the predecessor node 
along the path hears it and can treat it as the implicit 
acknowledgement. For each transmitted packet corresponding 
to a route entry, the node increases the NACK (not 
acknowledged yet) by one. In addition, for each implicit 
acknowledgement from the next hop, the node decreases the 
variable by one. When NACK reaches to a threshold (here 
three), the corresponding forwarding entry is erased and a route 
error (RERR) message is sent towards the source of 
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corresponding route to inform it from a link failure within the 
path. A RERR message consists of the Down-PathChain of 
erased forwarding entry. Every node acts with RERR messages 
as same as data packets. Furthermore, if it has a route for the 
message, the corresponding forwarding entry will be erased. 
D. Data Forwarding 
Data dissemination is very simple in CAR. The source node 
of a connection first puts the PathChain value of the entry in 
the Flow Table which is correspondent to the desired 
destination node and also new sequence number of packet for 
current session, on data packet.  Then, it broadcast the packet 
to its neighbors. Only one node (next node in the chain) has a 
Down-PathChain which is equal to the packet’s PathChain. 
Other nodes drop the packet and prevent from broadcasting of 
the message to the network. Furthermore, the packet traverses a 
strip area around the chain through the network to reach the 
destination. In fact, destination is the node which has a flow 
table entry with PathChain value equal to the packet’s one. 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
We analyze our protocol in the presence of several active 
and passive attacks and show that CAR ensures anonymity, 
unlinkability and untraceability in the network.  
Modification attacks compromise the integrity of routing 
computations. In our proposed algorithm, an attacker can 
modify control and data packets. If the attacker modifies RREQ 
messages, it will be dropped by receiving neighbors. Since 
every node broadcasts the RREQ messages to its neighbors, the 
probability that an attacker can prevent establishment of a route 
is extremely low. Modifying RREP, RERR, and data messages 
can alter the route and hence the flow of communication 
between source and destination. But, as the modified message 
will be dropped by all the receiving nodes, the altered flow is 
stopped as near as possible and will not affect the whole 
network. This will not allow an attacker to redirect the 
messages toward a different destination or increase the delay of 
communication. Another problem arises when a selfish node 
wants to save battery life for its own communication and 
endangers the correct network operation simply by not 
participating in the routing protocol or by not executing the 
packet forwarding. This problem, called Lack of Cooperation, 
is solved in CAR by means of multi-path routing. In other 
words a selfish node cannot alter the procedure because other 
nodes cooperate to introduce all other possible routes to the 
destination. Here, we relax the problem of Impersonation and 
Fabrication, since they can be addressed by an effective 
authentication protocol and are out of the scope of this paper.  
In case of passive attacks, we analyze the power of an 
eavesdropper to degrade the anonymity of our protocol. Since 
real identifier of mobile nodes is kept confidential during 
running of the protocol, we have successfully realized 
anonymous communication. In other words, sender and 
receiver anonymity and their relationship anonymity have been 
achieved. Based on the inherent characteristics of the defined 
chain, in route discovery and also forwarding phase it is not 
clear for a node that a message comes directly from the source 
or just a relay node. On the other hand, after set up of the route 
a forwarder cannot specify which neighbor will capture the 
message. Also, it is not apparent even for the last relay nodes 
which neighbor is the destination of a connection. In other 
words, every node is unaware of its location in the route. 
Moreover, an adversarial eavesdropper learns nothing more 
than some seemingly random numbers from the transient 
messages. Subsequently, no node can trace any route or data 
message to discover end points of the connection and hence, 
untraceability is realized in CAR. It is worth noting that when 
all of the nodes along a path are compromised, the path is 
traceable and linkable. 
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Here, we evaluate the performance of CAR and compares to 
other routing protocols through simulation experiments. 
A. Simulation Model 
We have carried out several experiences using Network 
Simulator, ns-2 [14]. Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) 
of IEEE 802.11 is used as MAC layer and an unslotted Carrier 
Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) technique with collision 
avoidance (CSMA/CA) is used to transmit data packets. We 
have simulated an ad hoc network with 150 nodes uniformly 
deployed in a 2400×600 m2 square field. The transmission 
range was 250m. Random Waypoint mobility model was used 
to simulate node’s motion behavior. According to the model, a 
node travels to a random chosen location in a certain speed and 
stays for a whole before going to another random location. In 
our simulation, mobility speed varied from 0 to 10 m/sec, and 
the pause time was set to 30 seconds. Continuous bit rate 
(CBR) traffic sessions were used to generate network data 
traffic. For each session, data packets of 512 bytes were 
generated in a rate of 4 packets per second. Source-Destination 
pairs were random over the network. During running of our 
simulation for 10 minutes, 5 pairs of nodes were maintained to 
communicate. Simulations were conducted in identical network 
scenarios and routing configuration across all the schemes. 
Results were averaged over multiple runs with different seeds 
for the random number generators. 
The processing overhead used in our simulation is based on 
actual measurement on a pocket PC. Table II shows the 
measurement presented by [15] on the performance of different 
cryptosystems. For public key cryptosystems, the table shows 
processing latency per operation, and for symmetric key 
cryptosystems, it shows encryption/decryption bit-rate. The 
overhead of modular arithmetic used in CAR for generating 
PathChain values in the route discovery phase is about half of 
the Tate paring overhead have been used in MASK. Besides, 
due to offline generation of large prime numbers and 
corresponding generators used in chain manipulation, the 
related overhead is ignored. For MASK and ANODR, taking 
consideration of the crypto systems proposed by the original 
authors, we choose the cryptosystem specification for 
simulation like [16]. 
TABLE II.     PROCESSING OVERHEAD OF VARIOUS CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
(ON INTEL STRONGARM 200MHZ CPU BASED POCKET PC, LINUX) 
Cryptosystem Decryption Encryption 
ECC (163-bit key) 24.5 ms 46.5 ms 
AES/Rijndael (128-bit key & block) 29.2 Mbps 29.1 Mbps 
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We evaluate the performance of our protocol in relation to 
these metrics: packet delivery fraction (the ratio of the data 
packets delivered to the destinations to those generated by the 
sources), normalized routing load (the number of routing 
packets transmitted per data packet delivered at the 
destination), and the average data packets end-to-end delay 
(the time from when the source generates the data packet to 
when the destination receives it. This includes all possible 
delays caused by buffering during route discovery latency, 
queuing at the interface queue, retransmission delays at the 
MAC, and propagation and transfer times). 
B. Simulation Results 
Figure 2 shows comparison of mentioned metrics among 
CAR, AODV, ANODR, and MASK. Diagram (a) shows the 
effect of mobility on packet delivery fraction. The original 
AODV protocol indicates the best performance possible on this 
metric. CAR in comparison to other anonymous protocols uses 
faster operation and this leads to better results in low mobility 
speeds. On the other hand, in high speed mobility, due to the 
more potential interference on established routes in unicast-
based broadcast model, more packets will be dropped and the 
delivery fraction is the same as the other ones. Diagram (b) 
illustrates the data packet latency. Thanks to the very low 
overhead on relay nodes in CAR, the end-to-end latency of data 
packets is almost near the AODV. Also, MASK has lower 
latency in contrast with ANODR, as a result of more efficient 
symmetric encryption algorithms used. Diagram (c) compares 
the normalized control overhead in terms of bytes. ANODR 
generates the most normalized control bytes. CAR and MASK 
put less control packet overhead on the network in comparison 
to other anonymous routing protocols. In low speed mobility, 
CAR generates lesser control packets than the others. However, 
interference in the high mobility which leads to route error 
messages and restarting of route discovery causes little more 
normalized control bytes. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Security and privacy are one of the most challenging issues 
in wireless ad hoc networks because of their open nature of 
communication. In this paper, we have proposed a novel and 
general framework for anonymous routing, called chain-based 
routing, to achieve anonymity in routing and data 
dissemination. Based on this framework, a new anonymous 
routing protocol, named CAR, have been designed for wireless 
ad hoc networks. By a careful and simple design, CAR provides 
anonymity of sender and receiver in any communication, as 
well as node unlocatability. Also, it realizes relationship 
anonymity and connection untraceability in spite of any 
internal or external eavesdroppers. Moreover, we have shown 
that CAR is resilient to different types of active attacks as well 
as passive ones. Finally, due to low computational overhead of 
CAR and based on the experimental results our protocol could 
be implemented as a versatile and cost effective anonymous 
routing protocol in wireless ad hoc networks. As the drawback 
of CAR we can point to the high potential of interference in the 
network in high mobility while broadcast packets conflict with 
unicast-based broadcast flows. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of simulation results between CAR and other routing protocols (AODV, ANODR, and MASK). 
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